Last year, I posted my ten non-policy reasons why I would vote for Jerry Kilgore.
Gerald Gray wrote back to me and said those reasons are all really bad.
Nevertheless, I am offering again this year the top ten non-policy reasons why I will vote for Senator Allen.
1. Allen was a Judge Williams clerk. And, he appointed Justice Kinser.
2. Allen has been giving pleasure to Hokie fans since his college days.
3. When he was a teenager, his family was tight with Nixon.
4. Susan Allen outrode the Tennessee governor’s wife on the Virginia Creeper Trail.
5. Like Elvis, Allen is of The Chosen Ones. (Isaiah 41:8-41:9.)
6. Allen was going to put Disney in Northern (and not Southwestern) Virginia.
7. Copenhagen, it makes me feel so good. (And, Fresh Cope it satisfies since 1822.)
8. His influences include “the cow boss that I buckarooed for on a ranch near Winnemucca, Nevada.”
9. He once told CNN the Southwest Virginia story “about a horse thief. And the jury goes through the whole case and they say not guilty, but you have to return the horse.” (I love that story.)
10. Gerald Gray isn’t running.
Wednesday, October 25, 2006
Another nephew football picture
I guess I'm among the very few who see a running back wearing No. 21 and think of Jim Kiick of the Miami Dolphins' Super Bowl teams.
NJ S.Ct. finds same-sex marriage ban violates equal protection guarantee of state constitution
In Lewis v. Harris, released this afternoon, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state's statutory ban on same-sex marriage did not violate the petitioners' fundamental rights, but that it was in violation of the guarantee of Equal Protection under the New Jersey constitution.
The opinion is written in such a way that it could never be followed in Virginia. The Court cites all the protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation written into the law of New Jersey. None of this background exists in Virginia law. I doubt that the analysis in this case would make it any more likely that some day the Virginia Supreme Court will find that the statutory ban on same-sex marriage violates the Virginia Constitution.
In the opinion, the Court noted: "The State rests its case on age-old traditions, beliefs, and laws, which have defined the essential nature of marriage to be the union of a man and a woman. The long-held historical view of marriage, according to the State, provides a sufficient basis to uphold the constitutionality of the marriage statutes. Any change to the bedrock principle that limits marriage to persons of the opposite sex, the State argues, must come from the democratic process."
On the first question, the Court agreed: "Despite the rich diversity of this State, the tolerance and goodness of its people, and the many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving social acceptance and equality under the law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as a fundamental right. When looking for the source of our rights under the New Jersey Constitution, we need not look beyond our borders. Nevertheless, we do take note that no jurisdiction, not even Massachusetts, has declared that there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the federal or its own constitution."
On the Equal Protection question, the Court observed initially that the rational basis test of federal constitutional analysis did not apply to equal protection under the New Jersey constitution, and proceeded to frame the issue in terms that make history and tradition irrelevant. "At this point, we do not consider whether committed same-sex couples should be allowed to marry, but only whether those couples are entitled to the same rights and benefits afforded to married heterosexual couples. Cast in that light, the issue is not about the transformation of the traditional definition of marriage, but about the unequal dispensation of benefits and privileges to one of two similarly situated classes of people." Citing the many protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Court concluded that there was no public interest, at least not in New Jersey, to support this different treatment.
The opinion distinguishes New Jersey from other states that "have expressed open hostility toward legally recognizing committed same-sex relationships," and includes Virginia in that list, along with Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah.
The opinion is written in such a way that it could never be followed in Virginia. The Court cites all the protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation written into the law of New Jersey. None of this background exists in Virginia law. I doubt that the analysis in this case would make it any more likely that some day the Virginia Supreme Court will find that the statutory ban on same-sex marriage violates the Virginia Constitution.
In the opinion, the Court noted: "The State rests its case on age-old traditions, beliefs, and laws, which have defined the essential nature of marriage to be the union of a man and a woman. The long-held historical view of marriage, according to the State, provides a sufficient basis to uphold the constitutionality of the marriage statutes. Any change to the bedrock principle that limits marriage to persons of the opposite sex, the State argues, must come from the democratic process."
On the first question, the Court agreed: "Despite the rich diversity of this State, the tolerance and goodness of its people, and the many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving social acceptance and equality under the law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as a fundamental right. When looking for the source of our rights under the New Jersey Constitution, we need not look beyond our borders. Nevertheless, we do take note that no jurisdiction, not even Massachusetts, has declared that there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the federal or its own constitution."
On the Equal Protection question, the Court observed initially that the rational basis test of federal constitutional analysis did not apply to equal protection under the New Jersey constitution, and proceeded to frame the issue in terms that make history and tradition irrelevant. "At this point, we do not consider whether committed same-sex couples should be allowed to marry, but only whether those couples are entitled to the same rights and benefits afforded to married heterosexual couples. Cast in that light, the issue is not about the transformation of the traditional definition of marriage, but about the unequal dispensation of benefits and privileges to one of two similarly situated classes of people." Citing the many protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Court concluded that there was no public interest, at least not in New Jersey, to support this different treatment.
The opinion distinguishes New Jersey from other states that "have expressed open hostility toward legally recognizing committed same-sex relationships," and includes Virginia in that list, along with Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah.
Excellent Chief Justice story
It says here that a couple of fellows from West Virginia walked up to the U.S. Supreme Court building and got in to see Chief Justice Roberts, with the aid of an old photograph: "Sporting a World War II veteran's cap and carrying an old picture of Roberts' father taken at a family reunion in Florida with nine of his aunts and uncles, DiBacco finagled his way into Roberts' office Sept. 26."
The story goes on: "Though it may have been some attorneys' dream, McCune said he had no interest of turning the conversation into a legal discussion. Instead, the three talked about their roots in West Virginia."
I didn't know the Chief Justice had roots in West Virginia.
The obligatory group photo is here.
The story goes on: "Though it may have been some attorneys' dream, McCune said he had no interest of turning the conversation into a legal discussion. Instead, the three talked about their roots in West Virginia."
I didn't know the Chief Justice had roots in West Virginia.
The obligatory group photo is here.
Why not to nominate Engelbert Humperdinck in Virginia
As Election Law notes here, the AP is reporting that "U.S. Senate candidate James H. 'Jim' Webb has lost his last name on electronic ballots in three Virginia cities where election computers can't cope with long names."
As for Engelbert, you can go here and find out if he is still willing to sing you to sleep after the lovin' with a song he just wrote yesterday.
As for Engelbert, you can go here and find out if he is still willing to sing you to sleep after the lovin' with a song he just wrote yesterday.
Now you can Broogle the courts of the Fourth Circuit (or some of them)
Here you can see how Brian Peterson has created a customized Google search, that includes opinions from the Fourth Circuit and some courts in the states that make up the Fourth Circuit, including the Virginia appellate courts and the Western District of Virginia.
I just made up the term "Broogle" in his honor. Well done, Brian.
(OK, there are a few other Broogle references out there.)
I just made up the term "Broogle" in his honor. Well done, Brian.
(OK, there are a few other Broogle references out there.)
Tuesday, October 24, 2006
How many times have you wanted to do something like this?
According to this article in the Richmond paper, a prosecutor in the City of Danville has filed suit against a juvenile and domestic relations district judge to get her to rule in a case, and got the circuit court to so rule.
District judge still going at 92
In the Middle District of Pennsylvania, they have a judge named Malcolm Muir, who is still hearing cases at age 92.
Saturday, October 21, 2006
What he said
Steve Dillard: "No appellate court should ever require the lawyers who practice before it to double space footnotes and block quotes in a brief."
Steve might have agreed with me when I freaked out on a Richmond brief printer for changing the font size of a brief without telling me. (No one else did.)
Steve might have agreed with me when I freaked out on a Richmond brief printer for changing the font size of a brief without telling me. (No one else did.)
Lessig on net neutrality
Here L. Lessig debunks someone else's debunking of his latest article on net neutrality.
When does statute of limitations run on defamatory website posting?
This Jurist post cites a decision by a federal judge in Texas to the effect that the one-year Texas state for defamation claims begins to run when the defamatory material is posted, regardless of how long it stays posted.
So, maybe we're in the clear for anyone we've defamed before October 21, 2005, as the Virginia statute is also one year.
So, maybe we're in the clear for anyone we've defamed before October 21, 2005, as the Virginia statute is also one year.
Just in time for Halloween - Judge Kelsey's article should scare every Virginia lawyer
In the latest VSB magazine appears an article titled Procedural Defaults in Virginia Trial Courts, by Judge Kelsey of the Court of Appeals.
Some of the highlights:
You can lose your right to claim the trial court should not have sustained the defendant's demurrer to your first pleading. Judge Kelsey explains: "The Virginia Supreme Court, however, has held that 'when a circuit court sustains a demurrer to an amended motion for judgment which does not incorporate or refer to any of the allegations that were set forth in a prior motion for judgment, we will consider only the allegations contained in the amended pleading to which the demurrer was sustained.'"
Res judicata can apply to claims never stated in a pleading. Judge Kelsey explains: "Another variant of procedural default, res judicata, should also be considered. In 2003, a divided Virginia Supreme Court held the narrow 'same evidence test' exclusively governed claim preclusion principles under Virginia law. That holding has been superseded by the recent promulgation of Rule 1:6, which broadened res judicata to cover, with some exceptions, all unpled claims arising out of the same 'conduct, transaction, or occurrence.' Such unpled claims will be 'extinguished regardless of whether the claimant is prepared in the second action to present evidence or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or to seek remedies or forms of relief that were available but not demanded in the first action.'" Now, I had not understood Rule 1:6 to supersede anything, but rather to express the ancient Virginia proscription against splitting the cause of action.
A defendant is in default if he submits only a demurrer and the demurrer does not cover the whole complaint. Judge Kelsey explains: "If the defendant files a demurrer as to some counts in a complaint, but not others, the others will be in default absent a timely responsive pleading directly addressing them." This is an area of the law made even more confusing by the recent changes to the rules. What pleadings cover the whole case?
Judge Kelsey finds some pitfalls in the language of the form scheduling order. He notes: "Rule 1:18’s pretrial scheduling order ... warns that experts 'will not ordinarily be permitted to express any non-disclosed opinions at trial . . . .' Two lesser-known deadlines ... appear in Rule 1:18’s pretrial scheduling order. This order provides that any motion in limine 'which requires argument exceeding five minutes' must be noticed for a hearing and presented to the trial court for decision before the day of trial. The order also requires that all 'dispositive motions shall be presented to the court for hearing as far in advance of the trial date as practical.'" The scheduling order is rarely used in Southwest Virginia, and its provisions mostly ignored, in my experience.
Judge Kelsey reminds us of the perils of Rule 1:1, as he says: "[T]he contemporaneous objection rule can almost never be satisfied merely by indorsing a court order 'seen and objected to.' Only if 'the ruling made by the trial court was narrow enough to make obvious the basis of appellant’s objection' will the otherwise inadequate indorsement suffice to preserve the issue on appeal."
Judge Kelsey concludes:
"I have no doubt that some procedural default principles may need to be recalibrated, either more tightly or loosely, to better balance the equities of particular forms of waiver. But whether that is true or not, this much is certain: No procedural default principle has ever produced even the slightest injustice to litigants who know the principles well enough to stay out of trouble. The benign goal of procedural default law, therefore, is to render itself harmless by being so well known."
Another point of advice - read everything Judge Kelsey writes, and listen to whatever he says.
Some of the highlights:
You can lose your right to claim the trial court should not have sustained the defendant's demurrer to your first pleading. Judge Kelsey explains: "The Virginia Supreme Court, however, has held that 'when a circuit court sustains a demurrer to an amended motion for judgment which does not incorporate or refer to any of the allegations that were set forth in a prior motion for judgment, we will consider only the allegations contained in the amended pleading to which the demurrer was sustained.'"
Res judicata can apply to claims never stated in a pleading. Judge Kelsey explains: "Another variant of procedural default, res judicata, should also be considered. In 2003, a divided Virginia Supreme Court held the narrow 'same evidence test' exclusively governed claim preclusion principles under Virginia law. That holding has been superseded by the recent promulgation of Rule 1:6, which broadened res judicata to cover, with some exceptions, all unpled claims arising out of the same 'conduct, transaction, or occurrence.' Such unpled claims will be 'extinguished regardless of whether the claimant is prepared in the second action to present evidence or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or to seek remedies or forms of relief that were available but not demanded in the first action.'" Now, I had not understood Rule 1:6 to supersede anything, but rather to express the ancient Virginia proscription against splitting the cause of action.
A defendant is in default if he submits only a demurrer and the demurrer does not cover the whole complaint. Judge Kelsey explains: "If the defendant files a demurrer as to some counts in a complaint, but not others, the others will be in default absent a timely responsive pleading directly addressing them." This is an area of the law made even more confusing by the recent changes to the rules. What pleadings cover the whole case?
Judge Kelsey finds some pitfalls in the language of the form scheduling order. He notes: "Rule 1:18’s pretrial scheduling order ... warns that experts 'will not ordinarily be permitted to express any non-disclosed opinions at trial . . . .' Two lesser-known deadlines ... appear in Rule 1:18’s pretrial scheduling order. This order provides that any motion in limine 'which requires argument exceeding five minutes' must be noticed for a hearing and presented to the trial court for decision before the day of trial. The order also requires that all 'dispositive motions shall be presented to the court for hearing as far in advance of the trial date as practical.'" The scheduling order is rarely used in Southwest Virginia, and its provisions mostly ignored, in my experience.
Judge Kelsey reminds us of the perils of Rule 1:1, as he says: "[T]he contemporaneous objection rule can almost never be satisfied merely by indorsing a court order 'seen and objected to.' Only if 'the ruling made by the trial court was narrow enough to make obvious the basis of appellant’s objection' will the otherwise inadequate indorsement suffice to preserve the issue on appeal."
Judge Kelsey concludes:
"I have no doubt that some procedural default principles may need to be recalibrated, either more tightly or loosely, to better balance the equities of particular forms of waiver. But whether that is true or not, this much is certain: No procedural default principle has ever produced even the slightest injustice to litigants who know the principles well enough to stay out of trouble. The benign goal of procedural default law, therefore, is to render itself harmless by being so well known."
Another point of advice - read everything Judge Kelsey writes, and listen to whatever he says.
Interesting unpublished opinion affirming denial of preliminary injunction in West Virginia non-compete case
In McGough v. Nalco Co., the Fourth Circuit in a per curiam opinion for the panel of Judges Niemeyer, Michael and Motz affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against the former employee for violation of his non-compete agreement, where the trial court judge in balancing the hardships under the Blackwelder test found that they "approached equipoise," but the non-compete was probably unenforceable under West Virginia law.
The panel remanded the case, however, for consideration of the plaintiff's trade secret claims as the basis for injunctive relief.
This case and the Gastonia case were the only two cases decided by the Fourth Circuit this week after oral argument, the other 65 or so cases were decided on the briefs without argument.
The panel remanded the case, however, for consideration of the plaintiff's trade secret claims as the basis for injunctive relief.
This case and the Gastonia case were the only two cases decided by the Fourth Circuit this week after oral argument, the other 65 or so cases were decided on the briefs without argument.
Wish I'd been there
JAMES RIVER 26, MIDLOTHIAN 14
Richmond Times-Dispatch
Oct 21, 2006
Grant Collins tossed two touchdown passes, and Andrew Brooks (my nephew) blocked a punt (he says he blocked two punts) resulting in one score and caught a pass for another as James River stopped Midlothian in the Dominion District (battle for the Coal Bowl and Chesterfield bragging rights).
Collins (12 of 18, 169 yards) chalked up TD passes of 27 yards to Larente Hamlin and 6 yards to Brooks for the Rapids (1-3, 1-6 - OK, so it was their first win of the season). His quarterback counterpart, Eric Waagner (8 of 19, 109 yards) passed for one TD -- 27 yards to Kevin Solomon -- and ran for another.
Markese Stovall began the scoring with a 1-yard run for James River in the first quarter. Thomas Metcalf recovered Brooks' block in the end zone for a third-quarter touchdown.
James River 6 7 7 6 -- 26
Midlothian 0 7 7 0 -- 14
JR -- Stovall 1 run (kick failed)
M -- Solomon 27 pass from Waagner (Moore kick)
JR -- Hamlin 27 pass from Collins (Brecht kick)
M -- Waagner 1 run (Moore kick)
JR -- Metcalf block punt recovered in end zone (Brecht kick)
JR -- Brooks 6 pass from Collins (kick failed)
Richmond Times-Dispatch
Oct 21, 2006
Grant Collins tossed two touchdown passes, and Andrew Brooks (my nephew) blocked a punt (he says he blocked two punts) resulting in one score and caught a pass for another as James River stopped Midlothian in the Dominion District (battle for the Coal Bowl and Chesterfield bragging rights).
Collins (12 of 18, 169 yards) chalked up TD passes of 27 yards to Larente Hamlin and 6 yards to Brooks for the Rapids (1-3, 1-6 - OK, so it was their first win of the season). His quarterback counterpart, Eric Waagner (8 of 19, 109 yards) passed for one TD -- 27 yards to Kevin Solomon -- and ran for another.
Markese Stovall began the scoring with a 1-yard run for James River in the first quarter. Thomas Metcalf recovered Brooks' block in the end zone for a third-quarter touchdown.
James River 6 7 7 6 -- 26
Midlothian 0 7 7 0 -- 14
JR -- Stovall 1 run (kick failed)
M -- Solomon 27 pass from Waagner (Moore kick)
JR -- Hamlin 27 pass from Collins (Brecht kick)
M -- Waagner 1 run (Moore kick)
JR -- Metcalf block punt recovered in end zone (Brecht kick)
JR -- Brooks 6 pass from Collins (kick failed)
Thursday, October 19, 2006
The specialist
In Chadwell v. Lee County School Board, before granting partial summary judgment to the individuals based on legislative immunity, Chief Judge Jones included this footnote:
"Political discrimination cases from Lee County are not novel, regardless of the particular political party in power. See Cooper v. Lee County Bd. of Supervisors, 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999); McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1987); Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978); Gilliam v. Lee County Sch. Bd., No. 2:01CV00083, 2002 WL 31906274 (W.D. Va. Dec. 30, 2002)."
Besides his role in the Chadwell case, Judge Jones was the judge in Cooper and Gilliam and a lawyer in McConnell and Harber.
(OK, this is interesting to me largely because I was a lawyer in Chadwell, which goes on, and Cooper and Gilliam.)
"Political discrimination cases from Lee County are not novel, regardless of the particular political party in power. See Cooper v. Lee County Bd. of Supervisors, 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999); McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1987); Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978); Gilliam v. Lee County Sch. Bd., No. 2:01CV00083, 2002 WL 31906274 (W.D. Va. Dec. 30, 2002)."
Besides his role in the Chadwell case, Judge Jones was the judge in Cooper and Gilliam and a lawyer in McConnell and Harber.
(OK, this is interesting to me largely because I was a lawyer in Chadwell, which goes on, and Cooper and Gilliam.)
That Virginia Court of Appeals split on funky Crawford application
In Gilman v. Com., on rehearing en banc, the Virginia Court of Appeals split 5-5 on whether to affirm or reverse the conviction of a woman found guilty of criminal contempt of court based on the affidavit of a juvenile court judge.
In the panel decision, Judge Fitzpatrick dissented, on the issue of whether the affidavit was used "testimonial hearsay" used in violation of the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court in the famous Crawford decision.
What makes it funky to me is that I'm not sure that the juvenile judge could testify. The Code says: "No judge shall be competent to testify in any criminal or civil proceeding as to any matter which came before him in the course of his official duties." Va. Code 19.2-271. If the Commonwealth can't use an affidavit, and can't call the judge as a witness, how can it prove this kind of criminal contempt case? I wonder.
In the panel decision, Judge Fitzpatrick dissented, on the issue of whether the affidavit was used "testimonial hearsay" used in violation of the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court in the famous Crawford decision.
What makes it funky to me is that I'm not sure that the juvenile judge could testify. The Code says: "No judge shall be competent to testify in any criminal or civil proceeding as to any matter which came before him in the course of his official duties." Va. Code 19.2-271. If the Commonwealth can't use an affidavit, and can't call the judge as a witness, how can it prove this kind of criminal contempt case? I wonder.
Whoever heard of 28 U.S.C. 2105?
In Hyman v. City of Gastonia, the Fourth Circuit in an opinion by Judge Karen Williams, joined by Judge Gregory and District Judge Floyd, held that it was without jurisdiction for the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2105, which says simply: "There shall be no reversal in the Supreme Court or a court of appeals for error in ruling upon matters in abatement which do not involve jurisdiction."
I'm not at all sure that I understand what are "matters in abatement."
In Virginia civil procedure, we know that "pleas in abatement" have been abolished, and that statutes deal with the question of, for example, when and whether death, change of name, or marriage shall result in abatement of an action.
Of the Gastonia decision, Howard Bashman notes:
"Recognizing that "Section 2105 [of Title 28, U.S. Code] may be '[o]ne of the most commonly ignored provisions of the Judicial Code,'" today a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision refusing to ignore the statutory provision. . . .
Today's ruling arguably creates a circuit split and also criticizes other federal appellate courts for having construed the statutory provision in a manner that could cause federal appellate courts to give advisory opinions in violation of Article III's case or controversy requirement."
I'm not at all sure that I understand what are "matters in abatement."
In Virginia civil procedure, we know that "pleas in abatement" have been abolished, and that statutes deal with the question of, for example, when and whether death, change of name, or marriage shall result in abatement of an action.
Of the Gastonia decision, Howard Bashman notes:
"Recognizing that "Section 2105 [of Title 28, U.S. Code] may be '[o]ne of the most commonly ignored provisions of the Judicial Code,'" today a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision refusing to ignore the statutory provision. . . .
Today's ruling arguably creates a circuit split and also criticizes other federal appellate courts for having construed the statutory provision in a manner that could cause federal appellate courts to give advisory opinions in violation of Article III's case or controversy requirement."
Chief Judge Jones upholds constitutionality of prisoner exclusion from FOIA
In Giarratano v. Johnson, Chief Judge Jones of the W.D. Va. upheld the provision of Virginia's Freedom of Information Act that excludes prisoners from requesting public records.
Of course, all the prisoner has to do is find a friend on the outside.
Of course, all the prisoner has to do is find a friend on the outside.
Wednesday, October 18, 2006
Nobody told me this about Jim Leyland
Hanging out in district court
I spent yesterday from about 2:00 to about 7:00 in Russell County General District Court. As my appearances in district court are rare, I always study the scene. If there are contested matters, the day goes into overtime.
In my case, there were too many witnesses, and they had been hanging out together all afternoon, so we kept them all in the courtroom so counsel and the Court could inquire of any of them at any time as necessary. At one point, the question was "how many of you would say the same thing" and we took the testimony of the assembled masses by a show of hands.
The judge was the Honorable Jack S. Hurley, Jr., with whom I had no prior acquaintance before the several trips to Lebanon for this case. New judges are always interesting. Particularly since he ruled mostly in favor of my mostly-deserving client, he rates as a gentleman and a scholar in my view.
In my case, there were too many witnesses, and they had been hanging out together all afternoon, so we kept them all in the courtroom so counsel and the Court could inquire of any of them at any time as necessary. At one point, the question was "how many of you would say the same thing" and we took the testimony of the assembled masses by a show of hands.
The judge was the Honorable Jack S. Hurley, Jr., with whom I had no prior acquaintance before the several trips to Lebanon for this case. New judges are always interesting. Particularly since he ruled mostly in favor of my mostly-deserving client, he rates as a gentleman and a scholar in my view.
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