Interesting cases being argued before the Virginia Supreme Court the week of April 14:
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, EX REL. SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. KATHERYN R. FLETCHER (Record Number 021186), dealing with the jurisdiction of the juvenile and domestic relations district courts to terminate parental responsibilities. Apparently, Hunton & Williams lawyers including Ed Fuhr, not the usual suspects in a juvenile court case, are representing the appellee against the Commonwealth's lawyers.
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. v. COURTAULDS PERFORMANCE FILMS, INC., ET AL. (Record Number 022244), dealing with the timeliness of the worker's compensation lien in a case where personal injury claims were settled. A dry issue that affects what lawyers do every day. The lawyers include appeals specialist S. Vernon Priddy for the appellant and James K. Cowan, Jr. and Joseph M. Rainsbury (Flippin, Densmore, Morse & Jessee, P.C.) and Richard Cranwell and H. Keith Moore (Cranwell, Moore & Bullington, P.L.C.) for the appellees.
FRANK X. LACKMAN v. LONG & FOSTER REAL ESTATE, INC., ET AL. (Record Number 021985), dealing with the appellant trying to escape an arbitrator's award, and AFFINITY LOGIC CORPORATION v. DIGEX, INC. (Record Number 022044), also dealing with arbitration, including the assignment of error that the circuit court erroneously denied the appellant's motion to crave oyer as to the arbitration agreement, when the appellant claimed there was none.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOLMES S. MOORE, ET AL. (Record Number 022242) deals with insurance coverage issues, including the circuit court's determination (by Judge Keith of Fairfax County) to find coverage based on a scrivener's error in the policy.
Also, there is a certified question, from the Fourth Circuit, in the case of C.F. Trust, Incorporated, et al. v. First Flight Limited Partnership, Record No. 022212. The issue has to do with "reverse veil-piercing," specifically, as stated in this opinion, these questions:
(1)"Would Virginia recognize a claim for outsider reverse veil-piercing under the facts of this case?
(2) If the answer to (1) is yes, what standards must be met before Virginia would allow reverse veil-piercing of the limited partnership?